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Abstract This paper considers two emerging interdis-
ciplinary, but related topics that are likely to create tipping
points in advancing the engineering and science areas.
Trusted Autonomy (TA) is a field of research that focuses
on understanding and designing the interaction space
between two entities each of which exhibits a level of
autonomy. These entities can be humans, machines, or a
mix of the two. Cognitive Cyber Symbiosis (CoCyS) is a
cloud that uses humans and machines for decision-making.
In CoCyS, human–machine teams are viewed as a network
with each node comprising humans (as computational
machines) or computers. CoCyS focuses on the architec-
ture and interface of a Trusted Autonomous System. This
paper examines these two concepts and seeks to remove
ambiguity by introducing formal definitions for these
concepts. It then discusses open challenges for TA and
CoCyS, that is, whether a team made of humans and
machines can work in fluid, seamless harmony.
Keywords Trust  Autonomy  Trusted Autonomy 
Trusted Autonomous System  Human–machine teaming 
Cognitive Cyber Symbiosis
Introduction
We now live in a world surrounded by technology. For
some, as implants complement or replace bodily functions,
technology also resides within. This new world not only
creates opportunities, but also imposes heavy technological
challenges. This paper considers two specific technologies:
Trusted Autonomy (TA) and Cognitive Cyber Symbiosis
(CoCyS).
Trust is a subject that has received tremendous attention
from scientists. Social scientists, psychologists, and lin-
guists have studied trust for decades in human-to-human
relationships. Further, computer scientists and engineers
have realised that automation is unusable if untrusted by
humans. Human factor studies have examined interactions
between humans and machines, humans and automation,
humans and computers, and humans and robotics to
explore the role of trust and improve the performance of
agents during interactions. These studies have revealed the
many elements trust requires.
Presently, the mechanisation of trust within automation
systems does not reflect how trust is institutionalised within
human social systems. Mechanising trust within automa-
tion is not a trivial matter. Further, it is a matter that
becomes even more complex as we move from automation
to autonomy.
Autonomy is a necessary condition of trust. An agent
cannot trust if it does not have the free will to act auton-
omously in and or in relation to its environment and
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interfaces. Without free will and autonomy, trust can
become a diluted concept.
Trusted Autonomous Systems (TASs) have had a sig-
nificant and positive impact on society in a variety of areas
[1], including in assisting the elderly, medical domains
(e.g. surgical robots and rehabilitation), systems that
improve robot understanding of human emotions, the use
of robots as teachers, space applications, and in entertain-
ment and manufacturing. Trust offers opportunities for
autonomous systems; however, without trust, benefits
offered by autonomy are severely limited, particularly in
complex socio-technical systems where high levels of
cooperation are needed.
TA research seeks to design autonomous systems that can
be trusted by humans and other autonomous systems. This
research beginswith the self-evident proposal that theremust
be a mutual understanding of trust between the truster and
trustee. If two parties do not understand the concept of trust,
the relationship cannot strictly be defined as a trusting rela-
tionship. Thus, autonomous systems cannot be trusted unless
they have their own understanding and concept of trust. This
premise relies on a distinction between trust and confidence;
for example, if a human relies on a machine that does not
understand trust, the human only has confidence in the per-
formance of themachine.However, if amachinewere able to
interpret and understand trust, then a human could trust the
machine. Presently, if amachine fails, humans do not strictly
view it as untrustworthy, as machines have no free will;
rather, the producers or manufacturers of the machine are
viewed as untrustworthy for providing an unreliable
machine. In these circumstances, an interaction between a
machine and a human is no different to an interaction
between two humans. However, we acknowledge that this
distinction between our position on trust and some literature
on the topic is only a guiding (and not a constitutive) prin-
ciple, and other researchers may consider these examples to
represent different forms of trust.
We commence with the simple idea that trust occurs at the
interface or in the space of interaction between two or more
parties. This interface plays a pivotal role in the formation
and deformation of trust. However, to date, this interface has
not received sufficient attention by researchers. Most studies
evaluate trust while considering one or more pre-designed
interfaces. Further, in many studies, the concept of an
interface has been limited to a specific form such as a
graphical user interface or some other mode of communi-
cation. In this paper, the interface represents the integration
interface or the space present between two or more parties.
The space interface of interaction among trusting parties
forms a web that connects parties according to different
relationships. CoCyS is a caricature of the space of inter-
action between the trusting parties and the associated net-
work, where each node represents an agent and each link
defines an interface between two agents within a particular
context.
Section 2 of this paper reviews the concepts of trust,
autonomy, and TA and introduces definitions to eliminate any
ambiguity within the context of this work. Then, the concept
of CoCyS is introduced in Sect. 3. Following this, the open
challenges in TA and CoCyS are examined in Sect. 4, future
work in Sect. 5, and, finally, Sect. 6 concludes the paper.
Trusted Autonomy
The Origin of Trusted Autonomy
Huhns and Buell [2] first coined the term TA in 2002 in the
context of Internet agents. They equated ‘trustworthy sys-
tems’ with TA and structured their argument by first con-
textualising autonomy within the agent’s literature and then
describing the ingredients for trust. Approaching the topic
from an agent’s design perspective, they attempted to focus
on social autonomy. They noted that agents are sociable
and aware of their colleagues and viewed external inter-
actions and coordination with other agents in the environ-
ment as constraints on the autonomy of an agent.
Huhns and Buell also discussed and identified the fol-
lowing three ingredients of ‘systemic trust’: understanding,
interaction management, and philosophy and societal con-
ventions. These three ingredients have been reformulated as
the ability to represent systems using a high level of
abstraction to allow systems to understand each other, the
ability tomanage interactions at the application level, and the
transparency of an agent’s ethics and philosophy. They also
noted two challenges: credibility and reputation. Credibility
is a function of the information provided by a source (i.e.
whether the information is credible) and reputation is a
function of the source (i.e. whether the source is reputable).
The previous view on TA was limited to Internet agents
and included the biased view that trust was a com-
putable concept. In the next section, we consider two
approaches to remove these limitations. First, we consider
trust and present a generalised model of trust based on
objective and subjective dimensions of trust. Second, we
provide a definition for TA that can be used in human–
human, human–machine, and machine–machine interac-
tions. We then discuss the open challenges for TA research.
Generalising Trust
Human–Human Trust
Trust is a social phenomenon that underpins interactions
between two or more human agents. The following social
definition of trust was developed for this study:
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Definition 1 Trust is a social contract between two
agents. The truster delegates a task to the trustee, but
assumes the risk that the trustee might be untrustworthy.
The trustee accepts the task, implicitly or explicitly
promising to be trustworthy.
Robinson and Morrison [3] discussed the expectation
that the truster (T) expects that the trustee (U) will be
trustworthy. Thus, the truster’s decision of whether or not
to trust the trustee depends on the truster’s level of risk
propensity. This dimension of risk offers another perspec-
tive on trust as follows:
Definition 2 Trust is a behavioural attribute dependent on
the risk propensity of an agent towards another agent.
Psychologists view trust through a lens of risk; a trusting
situation is normally perceived as an ambiguous path [4, 5].
The relationship between trust and risk is common theme
within the literature [6–8]. Humans may decide to trust
others as they seek to reduce negative risk or increase
positive risk (i.e. create opportunities). Thus, in situations
that require trust, a judgement needs to be made. Humans
make judgements based on an integration of their experi-
ences over time. A trusting decision combines an individ-
ual’s judgement and perception of risk with the
individual’s experience and cognitive attributes. Thus:
Definition 3 Trust involves the judgement of a truster
agent in relation to a trustee agent based on an integration
of the truster’s cognitive attributes and life experience,
including, but not limited to, the truster’s experience with
the trustee.
Trust exposes trusters to unwanted uncertainties; how-
ever, the interdependency that exists between trusters and
trustees creates social ties that establish social systems [9].
Trust creates uncertain expectations [10] for trusters. To
date, studies have focused on the concept of trust in social
and human systems [5, 9, 11], the implications of trust and
mistrust [7, 12, 13], and the ethics of trust and antitrust
[14]. Lencioni [15] identified five reasons for dysfunction
within human teams: absence of trust, fear of conflict, lack
of commitment, avoidance of accountability, and inatten-
tion to results.
Similarly, sociologists believe that trust allows an
operator to manage complexity within a social system [9,
16]. Trust (as a social operator) has a significant impact on
all types of interactions across many domains, including
marketing [17] and organisations [13, 18–20]. Further, trust
is a life-saving phenomenon in areas such as medicine, the
military, the police, and safety critical systems (e.g. for
airline pilots and operators of nuclear reactors). Thus:
Definition 4 Trust is a social operator that balances the
complexity inherent in social systems and the environment.
Thus far, this paper has highlighted four dimensions of
trust that can be grouped as the external states of an agent,
that is, behavioural, mental, organisational, and social.
These dimensions are referred to as external states because
they are subject to one agent’s judgement of the trust-
worthiness of another agent. A cumulative experience is
formed by an agent’s perception of another agent’s beha-
viour or how that agent thinks, the social system and the
organisation. This cumulative experience impacts the
judgements made by a truster in relation to a trustee in
human–human relationships.
Trust can be seen as a game, whereby the concept of
trust requires the delegation from the truster agent (T) to
the trustee agent (U). This delegation is associated with the
level of risk (R) that the truster agent will be exposed to if
the trustee fails and the level of reward or gain (G) that
truster will receive if the trustee succeeds. Without loss of
generality, trust can be modelled as a two-player social
dilemma game [21]. Abbass et al. [22] provided a gener-
alisation to an N-Player.
Player 1 Trust Do not trust
Player 2 Reciprocate Defect 0, 0
Utility G, G 1, 1
With the following constraint: 0\G\1. Thus, gain acts as
the reward when the truster trusts the trustee and as an
opportunity loss when the truster does not trust a trust-
worthy trustee. The two numbers in each cell represent the
reward received by the truster and trustee, respectively,
given a particular pair of actions.
There are two types of temptation. First, the temptation
of the truster to trust, (M1) and, second, the temptation of
the trustee to be untrustworthy (M2), where:
M1 ¼ G
M2 ¼ 1 G
The above game definition is very comprehensive, but is
disadvantaged, as the two types of temptation are depen-
dent on the gain (i.e. G) and one temptation cannot be
changed without changing the other. To generalise the
game, it was redefined as:
Player 1 Trust Do not trust
Player 2 Reciprocate Defect 0, 0
Utility G, Z -R, W
Cogn Comput (2016) 8:385–408 387
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With the following constraint: G[ 0 and W [ Z. The
game is a social dilemma when: G þ Z [W .
The two types of temptations can then be defined as:
M1 ¼ G
M2 ¼ W  Z
The revised game explains many of the definitions and
statements of trust discussed in the literature. It shows why
trust requires acceptance of vulnerability [23] (i.e. because
the truster relies on the trustee to gain but the trustee can
defect and cause the truster to suffer loss). Mayer et al. [23]
stated that a truster’s decision must also be based on free
will if the decision is to be deemed a trusting decision.
Human–Machine Trust
Similar to social systems, human–machine trust can
enhance performance in complex situations. If a human
trusts a trustworthy machine, the human may delegate tasks
to the machine to assist him/her to make decisions and
complete tasks in complex situations. Further, if this trust is
positively reinforced, task performance improves. Thus,
the effect of trust on relationships and interactions between
human and machines is very similar to the effect of trust
between humans in organisations or social systems. How-
ever, two questions arise: Does the concept of trust mean
the same thing in human–machine relationships and
human–human relationships? In interacting with machines,
are the strategies humans use similar to those they use
when interacting with other humans?
Barber [6] developed a taxonomy of trust centred on
three concepts: persistence, technical competency, and
fiduciary obligations. Persistence allows for understanding
and the creation of mental models of physical processes
that can be used to predict future events. Technical com-
petency can be categorised as: expert knowledge (i.e.
knowledge-based behaviours), technical facility (i.e. rule-
based behaviours), and routine performance (i.e. skill-
based behaviours). Fiduciary obligations refer to a truster’s
forced reliance on a trustee to perform his/her moral obli-
gations due to an inability on the truster’s behalf to eval-
uate the trustee’s technical competency .
Muir [24] used a combination of elements from the work
of Barber [6] and Rempel et al. [25] to form the following
formal definition of trust that applies across human–human
and human–machine contexts:
Tij ¼ ½EiðPnþPmÞ þ ½EiTCPj  þ ½EiFRj  ð1Þ
where T is trust, i is the truster, j is the trustee, E is
expectation, P is persistence, n is natural orders, m is moral
social orders, TCP is technically competent performance,
FR is fiduciary responsibility.
Muir [24] outlined four ways to improve the human–
machine trust calibration and identified appropriate values
for the parameters of the model to accurately assess an
appropriate level of trust. First, Muir noted that a user’s
ability to perceive a decision agent’s trustworthiness
should be enhanced. He outlined a number of ways to
achieve this improvement, including training to better
understand how automation works, providing the user with
explicit predictability data on the automation’s competency
and responsibilities, offering the user the means to receive
intention information from the automated system, and
finally, allowing the user ample chances to interact with the
automation to develop calibrated expectations.
Second, Muir asserted that the user should be allowed
flexibility to modify his/her criterion of trustworthiness (a
complementary concept to the truster’s calibration of trust
except that this is operated by the trustee). Flexibility can
be achieved through a transparent automation in which
expected competency, a history of competence and
responsibility, is communicated to the user. The criterion
level of acceptable performance should also be transparent.
Third, Muir argued that users should have the ability to
allocate functions within the system instead of being forced
to operate a rigid system. By placing the human in control
of the machine, the responsibility and authority for making
decisions are given to the human and thus the humans feel
in control.
Fourth, Muir noted that poor calibrations of trust may
cause inaccurate expectations of persistence, competence,
and/or responsibility. Thus, it is important to identify and
select any poorly calibrated dimensions of trust.
The model proposed by Muir [24] led to what is known
in automation as ‘calibrated trust’. In this model, trust is
calibrated along the above four dimensions.
Mayer et al. [23] proposed three general bases of trust:
ability, integrity, and benevolence. Ability refers to the
degree of the trustee’s ability to perform a task. Integrity is
the degree by which the trustee’s actions match the values
of the truster. Benevolence refers to the degree by which
the trustee’s actions match the goals and motivations of the
truster.
Jian et al. [26] used a three-phase study to understand
and measure trust between humans and automation. In the
first phase, researchers conducted a three-condition
experiment to collect words related to trust and distrust. In
the second phase, they used a questionnaire to measure the
proximity of these words to one another. Finally, in the
third phase, they asked participants to rate different pairs of
words. Their results showed that trust and distrust are two
opposite concepts, and that people’s perceptions of trust
did not change when general trust was compared across
human–human and human–machine relationships.
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In another study, Dzindolet et al. [27] found that trust
impacts automation reliance decisions. An important
matrix can be derived from their work, that is, the rela-
tionship between trust and reliance as depicted in the fol-
lowing Table 1.
An important component of Dzindolet et al.’s [27]
research relates to the results they found in different
experiments. Specifically, they found that participants with
no experience of a particular automated aid tended to have
a positive bias to deem the aid as trustworthy; however,
this also led to misuse when the automated aid was not as
good as their own self-judgement. Further, when partici-
pants were allowed to interact with the automated aid to
gain experience, they tended to disuse the automated aid.
Interaction and experience caused participants to reduce
their trust levels with the machine even in cases where the
machine’s performance was superior to the participants.
When participants were given continuous feedback on the
relative performance of the automated aid (as compared to
their own performance), however, even without the exact
decision of the automated aid being revealed, disuse was
eliminated. Thus, Dzindolet et al. concluded that offering
humans feedback on the performance of an autonomous
system (when it is performing better than the human) led to
humans learning when to rely on automation, and this
increased humans’ trust level in the automation.
Marsh and Dibben [28] proposed three layers of trust:
Dispositional trust similar to what Dzindolet et al. [27]
found, most individuals tend to trust automation;
Situational trust the context (i.e. environment) influ-
ences the truster’s ability to trust the trustee. Similar to
the findings of Dzindolet et al. [27], an operator’s
interactions with the system cause contextual variations
in the operator’s mental state.
Learned trust where previous experiences (i.e. interac-
tions with the same or similar trustees) influence the
truster’s ability to trust the trustee.
In a human–machine teaming exercise, Sycara and Lewis
[29] identified the communication of human intent as the
greatest obstacle to achieving effective human–machine
teams. They noted that the same three factors are found in
human–machine teams and human–human teams: mutual
predictability among team members, shared understanding,
and the ability of team members to adapt to one another.
In a subsequent study, Sycara and Suktghankar [30]
identified four dimensions of effective human–machine
teaming: information exchange, communication, support-
ing behaviour, and team initiative/leadership.
Joe et al. [31] evaluated automation in relation to teams
and found the following eight issues between human–hu-
man teamwork and human–machine teamwork: challenges
building a shared understanding of contexts, difficulties
anticipating and predicting intentions at individual and
team levels, machines’ inability to adapt at the same rate as
humans, an inverse relationship in the amount of interac-
tion between humans and machines with automation levels,
disruptions caused to human teams when automation is
introduced, the effects of increased workloads on humans,
and poor communication protocols between humans and
machines.
Joe et al. [31] also identified seven key principles for
effective teamwork using nuclear power plant crews and
used these principles to evaluate human–machine team-
work. The seven key principles were as follows: belief in
the concept of a team, effective communication, team
leadership (normally by a human, but this may change in
the future), monitoring individual and group performance
and providing feedback, coordination and assistance,
awareness of internal and external performance shaping
factors that affect teams’ processes and awareness that each
individual’s mental model is unique, and that it is difficult
to create shaped mental models in teams.
Figure 1 sets out a simple model of successful human–
machine teamwork that captures the information discussed
above. This model connects supporting behaviours with the
behaviours required for successful human–machine
teaming.
Hoff and Bashir [32] systematically reviewed empirical
automation research on factors influencing trust in
automation and then proposed a comprehensive model that
incorporated these factors. Their model covered two pha-
ses: prior to interaction and during interaction. Prior to an
interaction, three factors influence decisions to trust; dis-
positional (i.e. culture, age, gender, and personality traits),
situational (i.e. internal and external variability), and initial
learnt trust (i.e. preexisting knowledge). During interac-
tions, trust is dynamically learnt through reliance on the
system, and it is a system’s design features and perfor-
mance that impact trust.
Camp [33] operationalised trust using three concepts:
privacy, security, and reliability. Camp defined privacy as
the right to autonomy, seclusion and data as property and
differentiated between security and privacy by positioning
security as a means to control digital information. Con-
versely, privacy demands that people are able to control
their personal information. Camp also discussed the
sometimes neglected issue that security can conflict with
Table 1 Relationship between trust and reliance
Reliability Trust Distrust
Automation[manual Automation reliance Disuse
Automation\manual Misuse Self-reliance
Cogn Comput (2016) 8:385–408 389
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reliability; for example, a highly secure system may be so
sensitive to the need for a large amount of user data for
authentication purposes that it is perceived as unreliable by
users.
Figure 2 summarises the above literature into a com-
prehensive model on the dynamics of trust. Both the truster
and trustee must engage in the processes of perceiving,
communicating, exercising control on one another, making
internal judgements as to how to integrate perceived
information and deciding what actions to produce. The
truster calibrates the trustee’s level of trustworthiness, and
the trustee calibrates its ability to influence and shape the
truster’s perception of its level of trustworthiness.
Figure 3 summarises the factors related to humans and
machines and brings together relevant internal and
external elements of trust. It emphasises the two
approaches taken to trust: the risk-taking role (that psy-
chology studies have emphasised) and the complexity
management role (that sociology studies have empha-
sised). Elements of trust are grouped into internal and
external elements. The external elements are associated
with those complex elements that define and shape trust
in humans: behavioural and mental attributes of an agent
and organisation and the social attributes of the society.
The internal elements are associated with computable di-
mensions, including reliability, privacy, security, and
safety.
Doubts and the Two-Way Nature of Trust
As stated above, Jian et al. [26] showed that trust and
distrust are two opposite concepts. A doubt is a trigger for
distrust. The concept of doubt can act as a trigger for a
vicious cycle that promotes distrust if the truster doubts the
trustee’s ability to perform a task or doubts the privacy and
security of the communication channel between the truster
and the trustee or if the trustee doubts that the truster is
genuine.
Doubts are ‘uncertainty’ viruses in both human social
systems and human–machine social systems. Once a doubt
exists, it takes a long time and evidence for it to be elim-
inated. It is contended that humans are worse than
machines at eliminating doubts because of confirmation
bias. Once a human doubts another human or a machine,
the former will interpret the actions of the latter with this
doubt in mind, a bias that tends to confirm doubts. Con-
sequently, humans take a longer time than machines to
eliminate their doubts and thus trust again.
Trust in many situations is a two-way interaction. The
truster needs to trust that the trustee will not disappoint
their expectations. The trustee also needs to trust that the
truster is not tricking the trustee or wasting the trustee’s
time. This two-way flow of trust between the truster and the
trustee should be split into two different relationship types
to remove ambiguity.
Fig. 1 A model for successful
human–machine teaming
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By way of example, assume that a truster entrusts a
trustee with a delegated task. If the trustee perceives this
task to be a trick by the truster to occupy the trustee’s time
or weaken the trustee, the trustee may not accept the task or
may accept the task with doubts. In this example, the two-
way flow model has two one-way flows; in the first flow,
the truster trusts the trustee with the task, and in the second
flow, the trustee becomes the truster and must trust the
truster with his/her time and effort. Thus, we have two
different types of trust in this situation that need to be
modelled and handled independently even though the
decision of either party may impact the decision of the
other.
Distrust is linguistically antithetical to trust; however,
the two concepts of trust and distrust have been distilled
and contrasted. Lewicki et al. [34] argued that despite
being independent constructs with different sets of expec-
tations, trust and distrust can coexist; for example,
Fig. 2 A summary of the literature review on trust
Fig. 3 An overall
encompassing trust model for
humans and machines
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someone can trust another individual for a particular pur-
pose, but also have feelings of distrust towards that person
for other purposes. In the work of Lewicki et al. [34], trust
and distrust entailed different expectations and occupied
elements on a continuum. They hypothesised four different
relationships between trust and distrust: (1) low trust/low
distrust; (2) high trust/low distrust; (3) low trust/high dis-
trust; and (4) high trust/high distrust.
Saunders et al. [35] examined expectations and cate-
gorisations in definitions of trust and distrust and contended
that any definition of trust must include cognitive and
affective elements, and that these two different concepts
can be present at the same time. They concluded that trust
is a multifaceted phenomenon, highly dependent on con-
text. We rewrite Eq. 1 to accommodate context as follows:
Tij ¼ fcð½EiðPnþPmÞ þ ½EiTCPj  þ ½EiFRj Þ ð2Þ
where fc is an operator that manipulates trust based on
some contexts, c.
Other work on trust and suspicion [36] examined the
impact of trust on motivational tendencies. Deutsch [36]
hypothesised that trusting behaviour may have positive or
negative motivational consequences depending on whether
the trust is fulfilled. However, if the fulfilment of trust is
not certain, individuals are exposed to conflicting tenden-
cies to engage in suspicion or avoid trusting behaviour in
future.
Levels of Trust
If trust is a binary concept, then the question arises: Do
decisions to trust or not trust occur on a scale? Table 2
defines different levels of trust from the truster’s perspec-
tive. A truster makes two different judgements; the first
relates to the truster’s belief of the level of trust, and the
second is based on the truster’s belief as to the trustee’s
level of trustworthiness. A truster may evaluate a trustee’s
level of trustworthiness as very high, but evaluate the
transaction as a medium trusting decision; for example, a
truster may believe that a trustee is very trustworthy and
delegate a low-risk task to the trustee. In this example, the
truster’s level of trust in the decision is low, despite the
truster’s evaluation of the trustee’s level of trustworthiness
as being very high.
Table 2 shows the levels of trust and trustworthiness
across two dimensions (i.e. the truster’s temptation to
invest and the trustee’s temptation to defect). These two
dimensions describe different aspects of trusting decisions.
In circumstances where a truster gains a lot by trusting,
the truster’s temptation to trust is very high. Additionally,
if the trustee’s temptation to defect is also very high, if the
trustee does not defect, trustworthiness is very high.
However, if, in these circumstances, a truster makes a
decision to trust, the level of trust needs to be high, as the
truster assumes the risk that the trustee may defect.
Autonomy
The words ‘autonomous’ and ‘autonomy’ originate from
the Greek words atsomolo1 and atsomolia, respectively.
The Greek origin consists of two words eatso1; meaning
‘self’, and molo1; meaning ‘law’. Thus, ‘autonomy’ com-
prises aspects of self-governance and suggests that agents
rely on their own laws and work independently.
Before discussing autonomy further, we examine dif-
ferent levels of automation and intelligence, two concepts
that must be considered in any discussion of an autono-
mous system. Automation can be defined as ‘technology
that actively selects data, transforms information, makes
decisions, or controls processes’ [37].
Sheridan [38] proposed 10 degrees of automation (see
Fig. 4). The lowest degree being ‘the computer offers no
assistance: humans must do it all’, and the highest degree
being ‘the computer selects and executes the task, and
decides whether it should tell the human or not’.
Digney et al. [40] defined seven levels of intelligence in
relation to vehicles; however, these levels are generalisable
and can be applied to machine intelligence generally. The
seven levels of intelligence are as follows:
Level 1 Clever handcrafted algorithms without adapta-
tion in structure or parameter.
Level 2 Handcrafted algorithms adapted by hand and
distributed to the automation through the network.
Level 3 Handcrafted algorithms tuned automatically
across the network.
Level 4 Adaptation algorithms that modify parameters
online.
Table 2 Truster’s judgement
on levels of trust and
trustworthiness
Trustee’s temptation to defect Truster’s temptation to invest Truster’s judgement on level of
Low High
Low Low Medium Trust
Low High Trustworthiness
High High Very high Trust
Medium Very high Trustworthiness
392 Cogn Comput (2016) 8:385–408
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Level 5 Adaptation algorithms that modify structures
online.
Level 6 Discovery and exploitation of useful
relationships.
Level 7 Creative extrapolations for predicting
relationships.
Digney et al. also listed the following enabling research
areas to allow for machine intelligence: self-defining rep-
resentations and control structures; reduction in world to
functional abstractions; a unified approach to combined
symbolic and real-valued representations; a unified
approach to learning, planning, and abstraction; collective
control and learning for teams of vehicles and agents.
Freed et al. [41] distinguished between automation (i.e.
time-based commands) and advanced automation (i.e.
goal-based commands) and defines a third term: ‘variable
autonomy’ whereby intelligent control software adapts the
degree of automation. Autonomy can be varied by altering
the complexity of commands, the resources consumed
during operation, the number of subsystems under control,
the allocation of responsibilities, the circumstances in
which the system can override or allow manual operation,
and the circumstances in which the system can request user
information.
Freed et al. argued that on-board automation (as
opposed to remote or ground-based automation) offers
advantages such as freeing up communication infrastruc-
tures, removing communication delays and restrictions and
provides possibilities for on-board automation to replace
crews in the performance of some actions. However, such
automation can impose challenges (e.g. in relation to
software verification and validation and the correct speci-
fication of domain knowledge), especially for infrequently
used software.
Huhns and Buell [2] viewed interaction as a constraint
on autonomy and claimed that coordination activities
among agents constrained the autonomy of each agent.
They effectively argued that an interaction between two
agents constrains the freedom (i.e. free will) of each agent.
However, we did not adopt this approach, as freedom
should be defined within a social system (whether it be a
system of humans and/or machines) in which two or more
agents interact to improve the overall performance of the
system, rather than the individual agents. Further, auton-
omy cannot be defined as the ability of one agent to act
without the constraints of other agents. Thus, in this study,
autonomy was defined as:
Definition 5 Autonomy is the freedom to make decisions
subject to, and sometimes in spite of, environmental con-
straints according to the internal laws and values that
govern the autonomous agent.
On Trust and Autonomy
Trust requires a certain level of autonomy without which
the situation cannot be trusting. An agent with no free-will
may be able to make decisions on trust, but cannot be
autonomous.
Figure 5 captures the relationship between trust and
autonomy. It emphasises that autonomy depends on an
agent’s capabilities and the environment within which that
agent exits. An agent’s capabilities include the body,
Fig. 4 Levels of automation
adopted from Sheridan and
Verplank [39]
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software (i.e. control, decision-making, or the brain of an
agent) and the agent’s value system and motivational
derivers. Our previous work on body–brain coevolution
[42, 43] showed a trade-off exists between the constraints
an agent’s body form and the level of motion that an agent
can exhibit. An agent may have the potential to be fully
autonomous, but the environment may constrain its beha-
viour and thus deny it its autonomy; for example, an
autonomous car cannot exercise its autonomy if it is driven
into an ocean.
As autonomy implies free will, trusting decisions require
free will. TA occurs in the space that resides between
agents, that is, the space of interaction.
Definition 6 TA occurs in the space of interaction
residing between agents.
The Role of Motivation for Trust and Autonomy
Motivation is a core concept in human decision-making. A
number of studies have shown that differences in motiva-
tion effect trust and autonomous decisions. Thus, in
studying trust and autonomy, motivation in human systems
should be considered in the design of computational
motivation models. These models must then be integrated
with an autonomous system.
Implicit Motives
Enduring motive dispositions or ‘implicit motives’ [44] are
preferences for certain types of incentive acquired in early
childhood [45]. Incentives are the situational characteristics
associated with the possible satisfaction of a motive.
Incentives are either implicit or explicit. Examples of
implicit incentives include challenges to personal control in
a performance situation (i.e. an achievement motive),
opportunities for social control (i.e. a power motive), and
opportunities for social closeness (i.e. an affiliation
motive). In humans, differences in implicit motives have
also been linked to differences in preferences for explicit
incentives such as money, points or ‘payoffs’ in a game
[46–49] or during other types of strategic interaction [50].
Table 3 summarises some of the salient characteristics
associated with each motive.
Achievement Motivation
Achievement motivation [52] drives humans to strive for
excellence by improving personal and societal standards of
performance. A number of achievement models exist,
including Atkinson’s risk-taking model (RTM) [53]. More
recently, achievement motivation has been examined from
an approach–avoidance perspective [54]. An interesting
Fig. 5 Relationship between
trust and autonomy
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aspect of achievement motivation in relation to risk and
trust is the hypothesis that success-motivated individuals
perceive an inverse linear relationship between incentives
and the probability of success [50, 55] and tend to favour
goals or actions with moderate incentives, a moderate
probability of success, calculated risks, and of moderate
difficulty. Such individuals are often content to work alone
to achieve these goals.
Approach–avoidance motivation has also been studied
in the social domain [56] to model the differences in goals
directed towards positive social outcomes (such as affilia-
tion and intimacy) and those directed towards negative
social outcomes (such as rejection and conflict) [57]. The
idea of approach–avoidance motivation, together with the
concepts of incentive and probability of success, is par-
ticularly important not only in achievement motivation, but
also in power, affiliation, and other forms of motivation
[45].
Power Motivation
Power is a domain-specific relationship between two
individuals, characterised by an asymmetric distribution of
social competence, access to resources or social status [45].
Power manifests in unilateral behavioural control and can
occur in a number of different ways. By way of example,
consider individuals A and B:
• Reward power is exerted if A is in a position to satisfy
one of B’s motives and makes such satisfaction
contingent on B’s behaviour.
• Coercive power is exerted if A is in a position to punish
one of B’s behaviours by withdrawing B’s opportunity
to satisfy certain motives and makes this punishment
contingent on B’s behaviour;
• Legitimate power is derived from norms internalised by
B that make B aware that A is authorised to regulate
their behaviour;
• Referent power arises from B’s desire to be like A;
• Expert power is determined by the extent to which
B perceives A to have special knowledge or skills in a
particular area; and
• Informational power is exerted when A communicates
information to B that causes B to change his/her beliefs
and behaviour.
Five components of fear of power (i.e. inhibition tenden-
cies that lead to avoidance behaviours) have also been
identified : fear of the augmentation of one’s power source,
fear of the loss of one’s power source, fear of exerting
power, fear of the counter-power of others, and fear of
one’s power behaviour failing. These inhibition tendencies
moderate power by channelling the expression of power
into socially acceptable behaviour. Another balancing
factor that works in conjunction with power motivation is
the affiliation motivation.
Affiliation Motivation
Affiliation refers to the class of social interactions used by
individuals to seek contact with other, formerly unknown
or little known, individuals and maintain contact with those
individuals in a manner that both parties experience as
satisfying, stimulating, and enriching [45]. The need for
affiliation is activated when an individual comes into
contact with another unknown or little known individual.
Similar to power motivation, affiliation motivation is
thought to comprise two contrasting components: hope of
affiliation and fear of rejection. When unfamiliar people
interact, the hope component is activated first. Under the
influence of affiliation motivation, contact is initiated. As
familiarity with the person increases, the closer the rela-
tionship between the people becomes and the more painful
it would be if rejection occurs. The fear of rejection is
activated and becomes increasingly strong. Sensitivity to
relevant signals is heightened until the point of maximum
conflict between approach and avoidance is reached. When
fear becomes dominant, the closeness of the relationship is
diminished until the fear motivation decreases and the
affiliation motivation dominates once again and the cycle
then begins anew.
The maximum approach–avoidance conflict occurs
when both components are equally strongly aroused.
However, the avoidance tendency is activated later, and the
gradient of avoidance is steeper than the gradient of
approach. Specific affiliation-related goals include:
Table 3 Characteristics that may be observed in individuals with a
given dominant motive [44, 45, 51]
Dominant motive Possible characteristics
Achievement Prefers moderately challenging goals
Willing to take calculated risks
Likes regular feedback
Often likes to work alone
Power Wants to control and influence others
Likes to win
Likes competition
Likes status and recognition
Affiliation Wants to belong to a group
Wants to be liked
Prefers collaboration over competition
Does not like high risk or uncertainty
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• Being in the company of others,
• Cooperating,
• Exchanging information, and
• Being friends, where trust is an important operator.
Individuals high in affiliation motivation may also be intent
on effecting reconciliations with others, make more sug-
gestions to change the attitudes of others to bring those
attitudes more into line with their own, avoid games of
chance, and initiate fewer acts that might cause conflict
(this may also mean that they initiate fewer cooperative
acts). Individuals with a medium-to-high affiliation moti-
vation may be less deceptive than those with a low affili-
ation motivation.
The power and affiliation motivation has been the subject
of detailed analysis [58, 59]. McClelland [59] further clas-
sified affiliation motivation as comprising affiliative and
cynical trust and power motivation as comprising agentic
and stressed power. Affiliative trust refers to positive
expressions of affiliation, such as proposing marriage
because of love. Cynical trust refers to negative expressions
of affiliation, such as proposing marriage to gain access to
another’s money.McClelland [59] found that affiliative trust
and a greater sense of agency, as measured by associative
thought content, are associated with better health.
McKay [60] developed a coding scheme that assesses the
strength of two types of sentiment in affiliative relationships:
specifically, trust and mistrust. Individuals who view rela-
tionships as enjoyable experiences that turn out well score
high on the trust subscale. Conversely, the mistrust subscale
assesses expressions of negativity and cynicism about rela-
tionships. Scores on the trust and subscales can be considered
independently or combined to form a measure of affiliative
trust versus mistrust. This coding scheme continues to be
used in contemporary research, including the analysis of
social relationships between astronauts on an international
space station [61].
Trusted Autonomy Defined
In TA, autonomy is defined in the context of responsible
autonomy as follows:
Definition 7 Responsible autonomy arises from the
conscious delegation of a task by one agent to itself or to
another agent; however, the agent who is delegated to carry
out the task must be known to have the capacity to perform
the task and have the autonomy to accept or reject the task.
In the above definition, an agent is allowed to delegate a
task to itself. This does not eliminate the need for trust;
rather, it generalises the concept of trust to oneself—the
agent delegates the task to itself, thus, if it trusts itself to
undertake the task and be able to undertake the task.
Responsible autonomy places the responsibility on both
parties. The delegator is responsible for ensuring that the
delegatee can perform the task; however, the delegatee is
responsible for communicating its abilities to the delegator.
Based on the above definition, autonomy is either self-
decided or achieved by another machine or human dele-
gating the task. In the latter case, an agent becomes
autonomous when a task is delegated to it and the agent is
left to decide how to perform that task and what to do when
the task is complete. An autonomous agent can decide to
delegate the task to itself or to another agent. Thus, the
concept of delegation sits at the heart of the concept of
autonomy.
Accordingly, a less formal definition of TA is:
Definition 8 TA refers to an interaction between two or
more self-governed autonomous intelligent systems (in-
cluding humans) in which one party to the interaction is
willing to delegate a task that will make it vulnerable to the
other party (or parties) and the other party (or parties) is
(are) willing to accept and autonomously perform the task.
Delegation can be explicit or implicit; for example, a
group of agents cooperating to push a car in real time may
hold a shared understanding that the group has delegated
the task to the group members (i.e. delegation does not
need to be an explicit process/contract).
To avoid any confusion in relation to the concept of
autonomy, the term Systemic Autonomy is introduced and
defined as:
Definition 9 Systemic Autonomy is a social contract
between two agents (e.g. two humans, two machines, or a
human and a machine) or an agent and itself. The first
agent (the delegator) delegates a task to a second agent (the
delegatee). This contract comprises two sections. The first
section describes the level of delegation from the delegator
to the delegate, including any constraints in relation to the
delegatee delegating sub-tasks to others. The second sec-
tion describes the ability of the delegatee to perform the
delegated task at the level expected and described in the
first section, and the delegatee willingness to accept the
task.
Systemic Autonomy requires trust, as the decision to
delegate may create negative risks for the delegator. Thus,
TA was formally defined as:
Definition 10 TA refers to a situation in which an
autonomous agent willingly becomes vulnerable by dele-
gating a task to itself or another autonomous agent.
This definition requires that two conditions be present in
any TA decision: first, the delegation makes the delegator
vulnerable; second, the delegation is made deliberately
with free will. The concept of free will is a necessary
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condition of trust and, somewhat surprisingly, a necessary
condition for autonomy.
The definition also requires that both parties in TA are
autonomous agents and that each has a degree of auton-
omy. The minimum acceptable degree of autonomy in this
relationship is the capacity of the delegator to delegate
tasks and the capacity of the delegatee to evaluate and
accept the delegated tasks and communicate an ability to
perform the tasks.
In TA, the delegator becomes a truster and the delegatee
a trustee. The level of vulnerability is a measure of
propensity to trust. This previous discussion is not limited
to one or two agents; a group could represent a single agent
in this encapsulation. Thus, the definition of TA was gen-
eralised as follows:
Definition 11 TA is the ability to form teams of humans
and/or machines that make educated and conscious deci-
sions to delegate risky tasks among team members seam-
lessly and symbiotically
Trusted Autonomous Agents Need to Influence and Shape
Others
Rempel et al. [25] conjectured that trust between humans is
a dynamic expectation with predictable changes that begins
with predictability before transitioning to dependability
and, finally, to faith. Faith provides emotional security to
individuals and is thus harder to influence or shape than
dependability and predictability. Rempel et al. also
demonstrated that reliability, as a basis for predictability, is
important in making trust judgements.
Thus, interactions among agents impact each agent’s
level of trust for the other agents. Smart agents should be
conscious of this interaction and its implications. The
question then arises within TA is: Can an autonomous
agent be smart enough to influence other agents and shape
its own environment so that it becomes trusted?
However, before examining these concepts any further,
we will set out definitions for influence and shaping. Lar-
son et al. [62] distinguished between influence and shaping.
Shaping is viewed as a change to an organisation or
environment. Influence is viewed as fostering the attitudes,
behaviours or decisions of individuals or groups. Unlike
Larson et al. [62], the majority of the researchers tend to
assume that an influencing operation leads to shaping, such
that an influence works when it exerts a form of social
power. However, Larson et al. [62] noted six sources of
power: informational, coercive, reward, legitimacy, expert,
and referent.
This paper adopts definitions consistent with Larson
et al.’s, but elects to use themore accurate term ‘effect’ (rather
than the inappropriate term ‘change’), as in certain
circumstances influence and shapingmust operate tomaintain
the status quo; for example, if a trustee agent is attempting to
influence a truster agent by changing the truster’s belief about
the trustee agent, an agent ‘C’ can attempt to counteract agent
the trustee agent’s influence by influencing the truster agent to
maintain its belief about the trustee agent. Thus, influence
does not necessarily require a change to occur, only that an
effect is achieved.
Definition 12 Influence is an action that causes an effect
in the attitude or behaviour of an agent.
Definition 13 Shaping is an action that causes an effect in
the environment of an agent.
Coble [63] wrote a thesis examining a decision-making
model among nurses. Concepts included in the model were
creativity, experience, leadership, education, risk-taking,
and informatics. An analysis of the 510 returned ques-
tionnaires (that included demographic data and responses
to bipolar questions) focused on ascertaining influences on
decision-making. A correlation analysis revealed that
leadership had the biggest direct effect (0.33), indirect
effect (0.19), and total effect (0.52) on decision-making.
Experience (0.32), creativity (0.24), and education (0.24)
followed in total effect . Finally, risk-taking (0.14) and
informatics (0.16) had the smallest direct effects on deci-
sion-making. In examining human systems, Coble’s study
identified the key dimensions in an autonomous agent that
influence trust building.
Servi and Elson [64] introduced a new definition of
influence and applied this definition to online contexts such
as ‘the capacity to shift the patterns of emotion levels
expressed by social media users’. They proposed that
measuring influence entails identifying shifts in users’
emotional levels followed by an examination of the extent
to which these shifts can be connected to a user. However,
a question arises: Whether the process of influence creates
a shift in patterns of emotions that can be detected in the
short-term? Can the persistent application of the influenc-
ing process create a long-term shift and shape the envi-
ronment as a whole?
Shmueli et al. [65] discussed computational tools that
measure processes for shaping and affecting human beha-
viour in real-life scenarios. Trust was identified as a factor
that could influence humans in a social system. They used a
case study to introduce a new method of measuring trust and
determining its applicability to human behaviour. Their
findings suggested that trust can be operationalised and used
to predict passive sensing and network analysis. Further,
trust was found to have a significant effect on social per-
suasion. The experiment showed that trust was significantly
more effective than the closeness of ties between agents in
determining levels of behavioural change.
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Cognitive Cyber Symbiosis
From Adaptive Automation to Augmented
Cognition
The concept of adaptive automation [66] was originally
introduced to address the negative effects of static
automation. In static automation, a task is completely
automated, and the main function of the human operator is
to monitor failures in automation. However, studies
showed that human performance degrades rapidly in static
automation. Consequently, adaptive automation was
introduced that required the human operator to perform
small manual tasks from time to time.
Rouse [66] proposed two cornerstones for an adaptive
aiding system: human performance monitoring and online
assessment methods. Both these components are human-
centric (i.e. humans must monitor and evaluate the current
state of task demands and then compare this state with an
estimate of the human information processing resources
and human sensorimotor resources available). Online
assessment methods augment the prediction process of
human performances by providing information on what the
human is doing and intends to do.
Byrne and Parasuraman [67] viewed adaptive automa-
tion (i.e. adaptive aiding or adaptive function allocation) as
an automation design methodology that dynamically dis-
tributes tasks between computer systems and human
operators. They explained that psychophysiology can pro-
vide information on the effect of available automation
forms to enhance the associated adaptive logic, take mea-
surements of the human operator, and integrate these
measurements with models of the operator and perfor-
mance measures to improve the method by which
automation is regulated.
The division of labour (i.e. the split between the human
and the machine) can be dynamically adjusted based on a
multitude of factors, including the skill levels of the
operator, the demands of the task, and any system-specific
requirements that promote optimal performance. A human
may be delegated a task, not necessarily because the human
will be better than the machine at performing the task, but
because the assignment will balance the human’s cognitive
load while not degrading the overall performance within
the environment.
Research identified the following three approaches to
generate criteria for adapting automation to the user [66, 68]:
1. Automation that continuously listens to critical events
(i.e. environment stimuli) and engages as necessary.
2. In a model-based approach, a priori model of optimal
operator performance could be used to schedule
automation.
3. An automation that continuously measures operator
function (i.e. performance) and mental (i.e. physiolog-
ical) state.
Parasuraman et al. [68] contended that a hybrid of the
above criteria is needed to design robust adaptive systems.
Augmented cognition (AC) [69] has evolved as a form
of adaptive automation, whereby both the user and the
automation are tightly coupled via physiological and neu-
rological sensors. AC has three components: cognitive state
sensors, adaptation strategies, and control systems. The
continuous monitoring of the task, electroencephalograph
(EEG), and the environment enables real-time validation of
the implementation of an AC system [70, 71].
On CoCyS
The study of human factors and cognitive science has
unified the level of abstraction within which humans and
machines can be analysed using similar methods and
philosophies. Every agent, be it a human or a machine, can
receive information, process information, and produce an
action. Thus, the relationship between any two thinking
entities can be analysed and combined from the perspective
of information processing and decision-making. This level
of abstraction is referred to as information–processing–
action (IPA). The term IPS has been used to emphasise the
information and decision-making aspect, and the phrase
sensors–processors–actuators (SPA) has been used to
emphasise the platform or mediums through which the
interaction lives and takes place.
CoCyS characterises the interaction among entities as a
multimode network (i.e. multiple links can exist between
two nodes that depict different modes or relationships) (see
Fig. 6) and thus extends previous literature in the following
ways:
1. Nodes represent entities, and each link represents a
relationship. Thus, each link in CoCyS represents a
unique context for interaction; for example, an air
traffic controller interacts with automation to form a
situation awareness picture of the traffic. An IPA or
SPA approach to a system makes context crucial; if the
type of relationship changes, the context changes.
Thus, CoCyS emphasises the need for an explicit
representation of contexts.
Each node in CoCyS may have multiple connections to
other nodes and may connect to more than one other
node; thus, all links connected to a node represent all
the contexts within which an agent lives in the overall
network. Accordingly, a node represents an agent, but
also acts as an integration point for all the contexts
within which an agent is embodied and situated.
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2. CoCyS emphasises the similarities between cyber
space (i.e. information flows in an electromagnetic
spectrum) and cognitive space (i.e. information flows
in brain electromagnetic signals). However, it does not
limit the interaction between humans and machines to
classic signal processing; rather, it emphasises these
similarities to demonstrate that interactions must occur
in a natural space occupied by humans and machines in
a particular context. Thus, CoCyS emphasises the need
to find a natural space within which to model a type of
interaction.
The implications of the above discussion are critical. A
human speaks to another human (in the same language)
to negotiate contexts. A machine transfers data to
another machine in a common format. Thus, human–
human and machine–machine interactions live in a
natural space. However, when humans interact with
machines, this natural space ceases to exist. Previ-
ously, humans used a mouse to move a cursor on a
screen, now humans use their fingers on a touch screen
to move the cursor. The relationship has become more
natural for the human (i.e. closer to human–human
interaction), but is the space natural? Can a computer
reply by sending signals to hands that a human can
understand? Steps have been taken to place the
interaction in natural space; however, the space is
not yet sufficiently natural.
An example of a natural space is natural language
processing, where humans and machines talk to each
other naturally. A robot that uses its hand to shake a
human hand or exerts pressure to show passion or
confidence is an example of a type of interaction that
occurs in a natural space.
These two examples emphasise that for humans and
machines to interact in a natural space, each interaction
must have an IPA and SPA lens. An interaction is a
flow of information between two agents occurring
within a physical medium.
3. CoCyS takes the view that human–machine teaming is
a cloud (i.e. a form of cloud computing) in which each
human is seen as a computational machine. The view is
more than a metaphor; it emphasises a number of
issues that are pertinent to the success of human–
machine teaming including:
• We can attempt to model intangibles such as trust
and emotions when morphing humans and machi-
nes; however, viewing CoCyS as a cloud shows
that any model needs to be computational. Feelings
and intangibles are mechanistic and cannot equate
to human understandings of these concepts.
• Examining augmentation in CoCyS reveals that
augmentation is a fusion of different computational
agents; a computational model is run by a machine
and a human. This may sound philosophical;
however, it is essential that any ambiguity in
Fig. 6 A pictorial
representation of CoCyS as a
cloud made of humans and
machines
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analysing or understanding the augmentation pro-
cess is removed.
• Humans and machines in CoCyS are seen as
software on the application layer of a cloud.
Software does not need to know anything about
the underlying hardware infrastructure (this impor-
tant point will be revisited later in this paper).
4. CoCyS is a network of autonomous human and
machine agents. Links represent relationships. If
agents are allowed to communicate, communication
links appear in CoCyS. The absence of communication
links represents cases where agents are not allowed to
communicate. Autonomy plays a key role in this
particular case, where agents should still be successful
in completing their goals despite the lack of
communication.
Given the above, we define CoCyS as:
Definition 14 CoCyS is a cloud computing environment
with the nodes in the cloud representing humans and
machines.
Definition 15 CoCyS is a network of computational
machines that communicate with each other smoothly,
seamlessly and naturally.
The Architecture of a Cookie
A Cookie (see Fig. 7) is the name we give to a TA node/
agent in CoCyS. Each Cookie is a computational envi-
ronment that manages the relationship between any
human–human, human–machine or machine–machine
CoCyS pairs of agents. A Cookie has the same architecture
regardless of whether it is interfacing with a human or a
machine. For a human, this architecture represents the
protocol for training the human to think and act within an
environment. All Cookies in a network have the same
architecture, but may change in terms of data and models
dependent upon the contexts established by a link. Figure 7
shows the four systems of a Cookie.
Representation Management System This system is
responsible for representing self, others and managing
these representations.
A Cookie needs an internal representation to represent
itself. Philosophically, it is not being suggested that a
Cookie needs to be self-conscious; however, a Cookie
needs to have a representation that enables it to learn and
optimise its performance.
The environment of a Cookie is made up of all other
interacting Cookies. Thus, for a Cookie to interact
smartly with other Cookies, it needs to have a represen-
tation for any other Cookie with which it interacts.
A Cookie also needs to be able to manage its internal
representations and adapt these representations to meet
environmental demands. Adapting internal representa-
tions is one of the main challenges in TA and CoCyS and
is discussed further below.
Reflection Management System A Cookie needs to contin-
uously learn about itself as it interacts with the environ-
ment. Self-learning is a crucial feedback mechanism for
successful interactions. By learning about itself, a cookie
can predict future actions and select an appropriate action.
Further, to optimise its own actions, a Cookie should
optimise its own representation and learn to self-process.
Projecting, influencing, and shaping others A Cookie
needs to learn about other Cookies or agents. Such
learning will allow the Cookie to project actions in the
future and anticipate the likely actions of other Cookies.
A Cookie cannot optimise other Cookies, but can
identify the best actions to influence and shape other
Cookies in the environment.
Interaction Management System Learning, projection,
and optimisation of self are three classic components
that do not allow for the emergence of innovation and
novelty. When a Cookie challenges itself, it is able to go
beyond the norm and extend its own abilities, and when
it challenges other Cookies in its environment, it is able
to shape the environment in a beneficial direction.
Challenge and trust need to be considered together; trust
is influenced by an agent’s actions, and challenge is the
process of pushing an agent beyond its performance
envelope or comfort zone. Thus, these two concepts are
rooted in similar principles.
Dynamic Calibration System A major problem of real-
time systems is that the continuously evolving nature of
software requires a continuous ability to validate the
system and calibrate internal models. A self-calibration
and validation process changes the system from one that
depends on a human engineer for maintenance to a
system that can self-maintain.
Open Challenges for TA and CoCyS
Advances in artificial intelligence, engineering, and tech-
nologies continue to increase exponentially. However,
there are many fundamental problems that need to be
resolved before TA and CoCyS can be realised. Today,
simple CoCyS systems exist on a small scale (i.e. between
one human and one machine or a small group of humans
and machines), but if some of the fundamental challenges
of CoCyS are not addressed, true smartness and intelli-
gence in human–machine interactions will continue to be
limited.
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Autonomous Context Representation Each link in CoCyS
is a type of relationship between two agents that live
within an environment known as context. This raises two
fundamental research questions: How can a new context
be detected? And How can a new context be represented
efficiently?
A relationship can be viewed as system boundary on a
context; for example, motherhood defines the context
within which a child interacts with his/her mother. If a
mother is also the manager of a business where the child
works, a new link is established that defines a different
relationship between the two agents and a new context.
Each Cookie must have the autonomous ability to
represent a new context. However, a representation is
not just a simple data structure that holds information
about a context, it also encodes the boundary constraints
that define what the agent can and cannot do within the
context, the objective of the relationship and the value
system within which it operates.
To represent contexts autonomously, the agent needs to
be able to act deliberately on the environment and self-
generate a series of goal-oriented queries that enable it to
acquire the necessary information to represent the new
context.
Automatically Defined Indicators Indicators are the
magnets of any process search for solutions. Without
indicators, the objective is unknowable. A Cookie will
encounter many contexts that differ in their form and
nature to contexts tested during design. Thus, a Cookie
must be able to automatically define new indicators for
guidance in these contexts. This raises the following
research questions: What is the relationship between
contexts and indicators? How can this relationship be
formally defined to be computable? How can these
indicators be automatically synthesised? and How can
the interdependency, causal loops, and positive and
negative correlations among a set of indicators be
automatically inferred?
These questions are presently too difficult for humans to
answer. However, the answers do not need to be optimal;
rather, the answers only have to be sufficiently mean-
ingful to ensure that a Cookie is able to adapt and
manage unknown environments and contexts. Contexts
define the boundary constraints of a situation. A Cookie
needs to understand the context and autonomously define
its role within a particular context, be able to design an
appropriate set of indicators to measure the success of its
role, and identify the effect of its actions on its own
objectives and understand any other indicators used to
measure its performance.
Automatically Defined Transformations The challenge of
automatically defining transformations exists within
every Cookie system. It raises the following three
fundamental research questions: How can a Cookie
detect when it is beneficial to transform a representation
or to model another? How can an appropriate
Fig. 7 Architecture of a Cookie
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transformation be discovered? And How can the trans-
formation be performed? A Cookie must be able to
transform one representation to another, one model to
another, and one piece of information to another; for
example, an agent might quickly learn how to play a
game using an artificial neural network. This model and
type of representation allows for nonlinear relationships
to be learnt in a more compact form than classic rule-
based systems. However, it is not possible to use a
classic neural network to justify an action, as the agent
must be able to re-encode the learnt artificial neural
network into another representation (e.g. a decision tree
or propositional logic) that will enable the agent to
reason in relation to its actions [72]. Different situations
will necessitate different representations and models.
However, having a single form of representation for all
models will not only constrain an agent’s ability to learn,
it will also limit the efficiency of learning, acting, and
reasoning. An agent needs to be equipped with appro-
priate mechanisms to automatically define a transforma-
tion that can be then used to transform one form of its
internal models and representations to another.
Adaptive Representation of Self An adaptive represen-
tation of self is a necessary step towards developing a
Cookie’s ability to reflect on its own actions and think
about itself. This challenge raises a number of research
questions including What is an appropriate level of
abstraction for self? What is an appropriate representa-
tion of self? What measurements should a Cookie take to
represent itself? and How can a Cookie adapt its
representation of self as it evolves within its environ-
ment?
These questions are more related to engineering than
philosophy, as the objective of CoCyS was to engineer a
Cookie. The question of what self is depends on context;
self represents the role of a Cookie in its interaction in
some contexts. Thus, the level of abstraction to represent
self must be appropriate to achieve the objective of the
interactions in different contexts. Once a Cookie makes
an abstract decision, representation and measurement
questions follow. The adaptation question raises addi-
tional challenges, as a Cookie accumulates experiences
through different interactions; thus, original levels of
abstraction, representation, and measurements must be
continuously revisited. This is a challenging task that
requires an agent to be able to change its self-represen-
tation and the performance metrics required to self-
evaluate.
Autonomous Association CoCyS creates a collaborative
environment. If two agents are competing, the compe-
tition works within a collaborative framework on a
systems level. Thus, the underlying objective of CoCyS
was collaborative in nature. Autonomous association is a
core fundamental mechanism that underpins cooperative
interactions. Two agents will act together to cooperate if
they see that a cooperative relationship will enable them
to achieve their goals better than working in isolation.
Three fundamental research questions arise: Under what
conditions does an agent decide that an association with
one or more agents is necessary? How can an agent
observe an opportunity for cooperation in an environ-
ment that creates more benefits for the agent? and What
are the mechanisms and operators with which an agent
needs to be equipped for this association to occur
autonomously?
All three questions are of a great significance to an
agent’s ability to enter into a cooperative relationship.
To answer the first question, an agent needs to under-
stand its own context, abilities and goals to make
decisions to seek associations with one or more other
agents. The second question requires that an agent
continuously evaluates every interaction in its environ-
ment and seeks opportunities to leverage these interac-
tions for other purposes. The third question focuses on
the planning and communication abilities of an agent to
engage with others.
Smooth Interaction The success in implementing a
symbiotic process can be measured by the level of ease
with which the interaction occurs. It is asserted that
within interactions, there are two broad categories of
complexities, that is, complexity of communication and
complexity of negotiation. The first type of complexity
depends on how advanced a Cookie is in reciprocating
the conversation with and relative to the other connected
nodes/Cookies. The second type depends on the
advancement of a Cookie’s internal decision-making
process. A smooth interaction is associated with the first
complexity.
This raises a number of challenging research questions
including What is an appropriate set of interfaces for
communication in different contexts and between dif-
ferent parties? What is an adequate medium for
communication in a Cookie? What is the relationship
between the appropriateness of the communication
language and the context of a Cookie’s interaction?
These questions are difficult, as a clear mechanism needs
to exist to allow a Cookie to choose an appropriate
answer to each question. A Cookie must be able to
optimise the answer to each question based on the
context in which and the parties with whom it interacts.
Deciding and Reasoning A major challenge in the design
of a Cookie is that algorithms must produce autonomous
actions and reasoning . An autonomous agent needs to
autonomously make decisions. However, in a time-
constrained environment, the agent needs to quickly
make decisions and produce actions. Further, the agent
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must be able to reason in relation to its actions if asked.
This raises a number of research questions including:
How can the need for fast action production be balanced
against the need for reasoning that requires an agent to
logically infer actions from knowledge and premises?
and Can action production be separated from reasoning?
The last question in particularly is important in TAS and
CoCyS. Mathematical models such as feed forward
artificial neural networks can be relied on to produce
actions; however, while these models are fast, they are
black boxes with limited capacities to reason about the
actions produced. Conversely, classic reasoning (that
uses some form of logic) is known to be slow and does
not scale well in complex environments. Equally
important, as a knowledge base grows, it becomes
difficult to maintain the symbolic knowledge inside the
knowledge base and keep this knowledge up to date.
This suggests that action production should be separated
from reasoning (see [73, 74] for an example). An action
can be generated using an artificial neural network, and
when questioned about the action, classic reasoning can
be used based on a symbolic knowledge base. To ensure
that the two models are consistent in their behaviours, it
is important that forms of rule extraction from the neural
network are used to construct a knowledge base [72] and
maximise consistency and compatibility.
Uncertainty Management Uncertainty is a major concern
in the design of a Cookie and may occur for a variety of
reasons, including due to a Cookie’s limited knowledge
of another Cookie or an environment, the levels of
abstraction and fidelity a Cookie employs in one or more
internal models, the deliberate deceptive actions from
other Cookies or the nature of the context within which it
is embedded. Uncertainty management raises a number
of research questions including: How can a Cookie be
designed to be aware of uncertainty? What are the
operators and mechanisms needed to smartly manage
uncertainty in interactions? and How should we model
uncertainty (and prevent models from being subject to
uncertainty) [75]?
The main difference between models designed to
manage uncertainty and those not designed to manage
uncertainty lies in the ability of the model to adapt its
structure and level of abstraction. In classic modelling
design, a model has parameters and variables, and all
uncertainties are known in advance. However, this
design is inappropriate for a Cookie encountering novel
uncertainties. A Cookie needs to adapt the internal
structure of its model or even change its own model to
manage new uncertainties in the environment. A
prerequisite for this process is that a Cookie must be
able to recognise uncertainty, as it is only when this
occurs that a Cookie can initiate the process to adapt and
change its model.
Autonomous Analytics The discussion on uncertainty
also demonstrates that a Cookie must be equipped with
the ability to autonomously perform data and decision
analyses. A Cookie must have the ability to engage in a
process of data analytics in different environments to
identify the objective of the exercise autonomously,
identify what data need to be collected and from where,
design a plan for data collection, decide which models
are appropriate for learning, collect the data, train the
model, validate the model, and finally, add the model to
its model base. Important research questions associated
with this challenge include: How can the objective of an
analytic exercise be autonomously defined? How can the
appropriate level of abstraction, resolution, fidelity, and
model for a problem be autonomously chosen? How can
a Cookie autonomously decide on the appropriateness of
a data set? How can a Cookie autonomously fix a data
set deemed inappropriate? and How can a Cookie
autonomously validate a model?
The above questions are the important in autonomous
analytics. They highlight some of the questions currently
being debated by analysts and the level of challenges
faced in automating the challenges. However, progress
can be made in relation to each of these questions by
considering existing technologies and architectures that
may be used to achieve this progress (see [76] for more
details). The underlying key challenge for each of these
questions is the need for the analytical software to be
context-aware, self-regulate its decisions within a con-
text and be able to evaluate its analytics’ decisions
within a context.
Trust Analytics We mentioned a number of situations in
which an understanding of trust needs to be embedded
within each party involved in the trusting decision. Trust
necessitates that each party assumes responsibility for
some level of risk. To accept this responsibility, a party
needs to be able to assess the risk in the situation. The
term trust analytics refers to the data and decision
analyses that each party must undertake to assess, make,
and invoke decisions on trust. A number of research
questions arise including: How can trust be modelled as
a conscious process by which an agent blends its
emotions, experiences, and knowledge to make decisions
as a truster or trustee? How can a trusting decision be
autonomously evaluated? and How should a Cookie
autonomously present trusted results to a decision-
maker?
These questions focus on the trusting decision. To
answer these questions, mechanisms for integrating the
experience of an agent must be designed. Any such
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integration process must be efficient. Agents need to be
able to combine multimodal information such as emo-
tions, knowledge, and skills, to make a trusting deci-
sions. When a human is a party, the Cookie must identify
the best method to communicate to the human. If the
best method is through visualisation , the background
knowledge of the human needs to be analysed to
estimate the most appropriate information for visualisa-
tion and the way in which this information can be
visualised; for example, if the human is a network
administrator, a Cookie needs to visualise the informa-
tion for a specialist with the human’s level of skills and
expertise.
Influence and Shaping Operators As stated above, an
agent needs to be an active participant in a trusting
relationship (e.g. if a truster or trustee perceives that
another party should not be trusted or is not sufficiently
trustworthy, an agent must be active in influencing the
other agent or shaping the environment to change this
perception). The operators of influence and shaping can
be used to achieve this result. A number of research
questions arise including: How can an agent be
autonomously influenced or an environment shaped by
designing and monitoring the impact of actions on
another agent or the environment? How can key
constraints and indicators be identified to target influ-
encing and shaping operations? and How can trust be
influenced and shaped?
The above questions should be relevant to any decisions
a Cookie makes. Decision should not be made in a
vacuum. Decisions are made for purposes (i.e. to
influence another entity or the environment) to achieve
an effect (i.e. to maximise the benefits/objectives of an
agent). Thus, a Cookie needs to autonomously design
actions in the light of purposes and effects and this is
where Computational Red Teaming (CRT) has an
important role.
Computational Red Teaming (CRT) Any conscious
negotiation between two humans appears to involve
the autonomous calibration of the mental models of one
human and another and the context of the interaction.
Simply put, an educated negotiation may be based on the
following thought process: ‘If I propose X1, he/she
might propose Y2 or Y3, but if I propose X2, he/she
might propose Y4 or Y5; thus, I will propose X1 because
Y2 and Y3 appear better on average’. If this choice and
reasoning process is undertaken by thinking for the other
person (rather than merely anticipating their actions
from the outside), it is called ‘red teaming’. When it is
done systematically by humans or in silico, it is called
CRT. The previous example should not be confused with
classic reasoning because it relies on more complex
forms of decision-making and reasoning models.
Simulation, optimisation, and data mining using com-
putational intelligence techniques, when combined, offer
powerful methodologies for CRT. Many research ques-
tions arise in relation to CRT, and readers are referred to
[76] for a detailed discussion on the topic.
Continuous Calibration No model remains accurate
indefinitely. Even if the structure of a model does not
need to change, the parameters of a model may need to
change. Research questions about continuous calibration
include: How can a baseline be autonomously defined
for calibration? How can events be autonomously
selected in a naturalistic setting for calibration? and
What metrics should be used to assess a successful
calibration under different environmental and uncertain
conditions?
The above questions must be answered before any real-
time autonomous system is able to work continuously in
different environments; for example, when analysing
EEG data, variations may exist between subjects, within
the same subject at different times of day, in different
contexts, and in different environments. Fixing the
model to extract features from the EEG would very
quickly make the model inappropriate. Continuous
autonomous calibration enables the model to adapt its
parameters or even its structure in different settings
without human interference.
Continuous V&V A smart human continuously and
consciously validates and verifies his/her understanding
of his/her surrounding environment. This is very differ-
ent from classic software engineering approaches, where
an assumption exists that a model will be verified and
validated as used. If the complexity of the software were
to be embedded within a serious sophisticated autono-
mous agent or a Cookie, the classic cycle is no longer
feasible, as validation needs to be performed continu-
ously. This raises a number of research questions,
including: How can validation and verification (V&V)
be continuously assessed? If V&V becomes another
piece of software, does the V&V process itself need to
undergo V&V? and How can the embedded continuous
V&V process be used to discover problems and deter-
mine responses to these problems?
The above questions seem to form a vicious cycle. This
cycle can only be broken when it is accepted that (like
humans) machines will make mistakes, and all we can
do is ensure that these mistakes are not catastrophic.
There are different ways to reduce the chances of
mistakes becoming catastrophic (e.g. designing cars to
crumple in a crash to absorb the energy from the crash
and reduce risks to passengers is an example of the form
(i.e. body) and matter (i.e. material) of cars being
designed for safety, even if the software of the
autonomous car fails in the crash). Interestingly, this
404 Cogn Comput (2016) 8:385–408
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example shows that V&V is similar to risk mitigation
and that an overlapping multilayered approach must be
taken to achieve protections across systems.
Future Work
Figure 8 shows the two sides of the TA coin. The first side
represents hard-core engineering, whereby autonomous sys-
tems are seen as physical pieces of hardware knownas robots or
vehicles. The second side takes the approach that autonomy
exists in software; thus, a TAS needs to be equipped with the
necessary analytical tools and techniques to exercise autonomy.
To design a TAS, four broad issues must be addressed.
First, the issue of plasticity, that is, a system must be able to
continue to operate robustly and adapt itself to an
unanticipated environment. Plasticity as an internal charac-
teristic of a vehicle is not sufficient. The system or the robot
needs to be able to augment itself with any sensors available
in its environment to maximise its own situation awareness
and benefits. This process requires self-consciousness so that
the vehicle can identify its own vulnerabilities and leverage
elements available in the environment to its own advantage.
The third issue is that the systemmust be able to teamwith
others as necessary. This issue emphasises the ability of the
vehicle to interface with others. The fourth issue relates to
‘red teaming’ [77], that is, a system needs to play devil’s
advocate with itself and have the ability to self-evaluate.
Analytics view TASs from a software perspective and
requires that the system be able to generate its own
hypothesis, evaluate this hypothesis, and be able to self-
judge and self-test.
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In the light of above, the pictorial equation of TA was
designed as:
Trusted Autonomy ¼ PATþ HAT
Future work on TAS will largely touch on one or more
aspects of the previous equation. However, only when all
components of the equation are addressed, TAS will be
both trusted and autonomous.
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented an overview of the literature on
trust and autonomy.TAwas considered in the light of previous
research, and relevant definitions and conceptualisationswere
provided. The concept of a trusted autonomous agentwas then
generalised to a network made of humans and machines that
use CoCyS. The architecture of a node in CoCyS (i.e. a
Cookie) was presented in sufficient detail to map the main
ingredients of the concept. The paper then concluded by dis-
cussing open challenges in the areas of TA and CoCyS.
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